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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE AND CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT: THE GORSUCH
CONTROVERSY
Congress, as the arm of the government responsible for making
and overseeing the operation of the nation's laws, has the power to
inquire into and review the methods by which those laws are enforced.I
Because the executive branch is responsible for enforcing the laws,
Congress necessarily requests evidence from that branch. On occasion,
the President has sought to protect himself and his officials from
congressional overreaching by arguing that the doctrine of executive
privilege protects him from compelled disclosure of information or
documents.2
The President and his officials have asserted this claim frequently.3
Most recently, Anne M. Gorsuch,4 former Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), claimed an executive
privilege when she refused to comply with a subpoena issued in
connection with the inquiry of a House of Representatives
subcommittee.5 The subcommittee was investigating the EPA's
implementation of the Superfund program for the treatment of
hazardous waste sites. As a result of Ms. Gorsuch's refusal to produce
the documents, Congress held her in contempt-the first time in United
States history that the legislative branch has taken such action against
I. This power is known as oversight or right of inquiry. See infra text accompanying notes
42-55.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 67-99.
3. See Berger, Executive Privilege v. CongressionalInquiry (Part I1), 12 UCLA L. REv. 1288,
1333 n.627 (1965). President Eisenhower made one of the most notable claims when he refused to
surrender evidence that Senator McCarthy requested in connection with McCarthy's investigation
into communism. Eisenhower's claim was one of the boldest assertions by an executive of the
right to withhold information from Congress. Id at 1309.
4. On February 12, 1983, shortly before Congress dropped the contempt citation, Ms.
Gorsuch remarried, changing her name to Anne Gorsuch Burford. She is referred to as Ms.
Gorsuch throughout this note.
5. Two House subcommittees, the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the
Committee on Public Works and Transportation, and the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, sought information from Ms.
Gorsuch. This note will focus on the efforts of the former to obtain documents pertaining to the
Superfund.
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the head of an executive agency or department. 6 Although the
President and the subcommittee eventually arrived at a compromise,
7
this incident illustrates the historical tension between congressional
oversight and executive privilege and highlights the lack of formal
methods for resolving such disputes.8
This note examines the competing claims of the congressional
right to information and the executive's need for secrecy, in light of the
Gorsuch dispute. It also suggests methods for resolving future
disputes. The note begins with an overview of the dispute and the
eventual compromise. 9 It then examines the rights of oversight and
executive privilege in more detail and describes both Ms. Gorsuch's
and the House subcommittee's claims under these doctrines.' 0 Finally,
it suggests methods for resolving such interbranch conflicts." This
note argues that compromise is the preferred method; in most cases the
involved parties have sufficient incentives to negotiate their differences
and should be allowed to do so. Because, in rare instances, a
compromise may not be reached, courts must be ready to settle these
clashes, as long as the dispute does not present a nonjusticiable
"political" question. The note therefore suggests a framework for the
judicial analysis of future disputes.
I. CONGRESS'S CONFRONTATION WITH THE EPA ADMINISTRATOR
In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),' 2 its most recent
statutory effort to solve the hazardous waste problem. The Act estab-
lishes a 1.6 billion dollar hazardous substance response trust fund, the
Superfund, to be used to pay governmental response costs in the ame-
lioration of hazardous waste deposits and spills.' 3 The Act also man-
dates extensive reporting and recordkeeping requirements for both
present and former hazardous waste disposal sites. 14 The Act requires
6. See Brief for Plaintiff at 2, United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150
(D.D.C. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Brie/I.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 35-38.
8. See infra text accompanying note 104.
9. See infra notes 12-38 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 39-104 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 106-49 and accompanying text.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (Supp. V 1981). Superfund financing comes largely from excise taxes
on companies that generate chemical and petroleum products and on owners of hazardous waste
disposal sites. See I.R.C. §§ 4611-4612, 4661-4662, 4681-4682 (West Supp. 1983). The disposal
site tax is used to finance the monitoring and closure of hazardous waste disposal sites that re-
ceived operating permits. See 42 U.S.C. § 9641 (Supp. V 1981).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (Supp. V 1981).
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that the President establish a National Contingency Plan (NCP) to de-
velop procedures for responding to releases of hazardous wastes, for
discovering hazardous waste locations, and for evaluating removal
costs and methods. 15 Additionally, the Act empowers the President to
respond to actual or threatened releases of hazardous substances.1 6
On August 14, 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12,316, "Responses to Environmental Damage," which delegated to
EPA Administrator Gorsuch the "responsibility for the amendment of
the NCP and all of the other functions vested in the President by Sec-
tion 105" of the CERCLA.' 7 The EPA Administrator thus assumed
responsibility for ensuring that parties responsible for abandoned or
inoperative hazardous waste sites would clean them up.18
On March 10, 1982, the House Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation
began an investigation to determine the manner in which the EPA was
enforcing federal laws addressing the hazardous waste problem, includ-
ing the CERCLA.' 9 The subcommittee held a field hearing in New
York City, in which it received testimony from various local govern-
ment officials,20 representatives of citizen groups,2' and officials from
the United States General Accounting Office.22 As a result of this and
other hearings,23 the subcommittee concluded that many of the hazard-
15. Id. § 9605. Parties responsible for creating hazardous waste sites or chemical spills are
liable for: (1) the costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the federal government or state;
(2) private response costs consistent with the National Contingency Plan; and (3) damages for
injury to natural resources. Id. § 9607(a).
16. Id. § 9604. The President may take whatever remedial steps are "necessary to protect
the public health or welfare or the environment." Id. § 9604(a)(1).
17. Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168, 169 (1982).
18. Id
19. "A central concern in this investigation and review by the Subcommittee was, and contin-
ues to be, the efforts being made by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to carry out the
framework of federal laws that address, in whole or in part, hazardous waste contamination of
water resources." H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982).
20. The Mayor of Oswego, New York, the town that is the site of the Pollution Abatement
Services Company, an abandoned liquid waste incineration operation, expressed concern at the
length of time taken to decontaminate that site. Id at 8.
21. Residents of Port Washington, N.Y. testified, speculating that large quantities of toxic
chemicals may have been illegally disposed of in the community's domestic waste landfill. Id
22. A representative from the United States General Accounting Office testified that the
EPA's efforts to carry out the Superfund law, including the development of implementing regula-
tions and the National Contingency Plan, were significantly behind schedule, and thus were de-
laying the rate at which toxic waste sites were being cleaned up. Id
23. On March 10, 1982, the subcommittee held a hearing in which it reviewed the EPA's
previous decision to suspend a restriction on dumping liquid waste in landfills, an action that had
raised the possibility that many new "Love Canals" might be created. Id at 7. The two EPA
officials testifying were unable to provide justification for suspending the ban. Id On March 17,
the EPA announced that it was partially reinstituting the ban. Id On March 30, 1982, the sub-
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ous waste sites were not being fully, or expeditiously, decontaminated.
The subcommittee also found that many of the companies responsible
for the wastes were not being held fully liable for their share of the
cleanup costs.24
The subcommittee sought to review the EPA's Superfund enforce-
ment files in order to determine exactly how the EPA was administer-
ing the fund. After unsuccessful attempts to obtain these files
informally,2 5 the subcommittee authorized subpoenas to be issued to
the EPA Administrator and other EPA officials, should they continue
to deny the subcommittee access to the disputed enforcement files.26
On October 29, 1982, EPA enforcement staff officials refused a
subcommittee request to provide access to enforcement files on three
waste sites.27 As a result, the House Committee on Public Works and
Transportation issued a subpoena to EPA Administrator Anne M. Gor-
such. The subpoena called for her to appear before the Subcommittee
committee met again to question the same officials further about the landfills. Their testimony
conflicted with the earlier testimony, creating suspicion as to whether there had been any need to
suspend the ban. See id at 8.
24. Id at 9. As a result of this assessment, the subcommittee conducted additional hearings.
Its inquiry, with respect to the Superfund statute, focused heavily on:
Whether there are statutory requirements and/or administrative policies, practices
and procedures that affect the government's (EPA's) ability to function effectively and
achieve the objectives of the law, or whether amendments to the statute are needed;
Whether the Superfund law's enforcement provisions are being fully and effectively
carried out;
Whether adequate efforts have been, or are being made to obtain and/or recover the
full costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites from responsible parties;
Whether the Fund, and the existing sources and amounts of revenue for it, particu-
larly the tax on oil and chemicals, is adequate to address both known and potential
hazardous waste sites and chemical spills; and
What information is being considered, or not being considered by the EPA, in its
administration and management of the Fund, and its execution of responsibilities under
the Superfund law.
Id
25. The EPA was less than cooperative with the subcommittee. On September 14, 1982, the
subcommittee staff was told that it would have access to the Agency's Region II Superfund en-
forcement files in New York City. On September 15, the subcommittee staff travelled to New
York, but an EPA official there told them that "any of the engineering and technical studies that
were being prepared by the several EPA Region II Superfund priority sites could be made avail-
able, but that the Subcommittee could not have access to the enforcement files." Id at 11. On
September 16, the subcommittee submitted a written request for the documents in dispute to the
EPA Administrator and to others in the Agency, in conformance with section 9604(e)(2)(D) of the
Superfund law, which requires that "all information reported to or otherwise obtained by the
President (or any representative of the President) under this chapter shall be made available, upon
written request of any duly authorized committee of the Congress, to such committee." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(e)(2)(D) (Supp. V 1981). Department of Justice official Stephen Ramsey indicated his be-
lief that this section did not give the subcommittee the authority to request the kind of information
that they were seeking. H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982).
26. H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982).
27. See id at 14.
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on Investigations and Oversight on December 2, 1982 and to produce
all books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, notes, and
documents drawn or received by the Administrator or other EPA offi-
cials since December 11, 1980.28 In short, the subpoena covered all the
pertinent enforcement-related documents concerning the 160 desig-
nated Superfund cleanup sites.29
Prior to her appearance, Ms. Gorsuch received a memorandum
from President Reagan instructing her not to make sensitive documents
found in active law enforcement files available to Congress or the pub-
lic except in extraordinary circumstances. 30 She quoted these instruc-
tions in her testimony to the subcommittee and informed it that she
would not make certain requested documents available.3 1 Following
her testimony, the subcommittee approved a resolution holding Ms.
Gorsuch in contempt.32 On December 16, 1982, the full House of Rep-
resentatives, noting the Administrator's "contumacious conduct,"
passed a resolution citing Ms. Gorsuch for contempt of Congress.33
Although the House action created what some have termed an
"unprecedented constitutional impasse" between the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches of the government, 34 the parties arrived at a compro-
mise two months later. On February 18, 1983, subcommittee chairman
Levitas and President Reagan agreed to procedures under which sub-
committee members would be allowed to examine the subpoenaed
28. Id at 33.
29. See id at 50-53.
30. The memorandum stated that "[b]ecause dissemination of such documents outside the
Executive Branch would impair my solemn responsibility to enforce the law, I instruct you and
your agency not to furnish copies of this category of documents to the subcommittee in response to
their subpoenas." Memorandum for the Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency (Nov.
30, 1982), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43 (1982).
31. H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982). Administrator Gorsuch explained,
however, that more than 750,000 pages of documents would be made available to the subcommit-
tee. The first five fie boxes of such documents were tendered to the subcommittee, but it declined
to accept those documents. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 6, at 14. Ms. Gorsuch also advised
the subcommittee that the subpoena as drawn was defective. See H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 17 (1982).
32. The Resolution, approved by a nine to two vote, states:
Be it resolved, That the Subcomhittee finds Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, in contempt for failure to comply with the subpoena
ordered by this Subcommittee and dated November 16, 1982, and the facts of this failure
be reported by the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight to
the Committee on Public Works and Transportation for such action as that Committee
deems appropriate.
H.R. REP. No. 968, supra note 19, at 20.
33. H.R. Res. 632, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 149 CoNG. Rac. H10,040 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1982).
House Resolution 632 was approved 259-105 with 69 members abstaining. Id at H10,061.
34. Petltioner'r BrIef, supra note 6, at 1.
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EPA documents. 35 The subcommittee was to receive edited versions of
the requested documents and EPA officials would brief the subcommit-
tee on their contents.36 After this initial screening, subcommittee mem-
bers would be permitted to review the unedited versions of the
documents in closed session.37 President Reagan hailed the compro-
mise as "consistent with the doctrine of executive privilege while it also
assures that necessary information is made available to the
Congress." 38
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
The fact that Congress and the EPA reached a compromise does
not diminish the significance of the contempt citation. Congress had
never before taken such severe action in order to obtain information
from the executive branch. Yet, although Congress's use of the con-
tempt power was unprecedented, the doctrines that had led to its use
were not. The subcommittee and the EPA were properly relying upon
the conflicting but well-established rights of oversight and executive
privilege.
A. Congress's Claim to the Documents.
The House subcommittee believed that it had an absolute right to
the requested documents. 39 The House of Representatives demon-
strated its agreement with the subcommittee's position by issuing the
contempt citation. Both the subcommittee and the full House recog-
nized that the President was to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed"; 4° they claimed, however, that this constitutional mandate
35. Final details of the compromise were worked out by Levitas, White House Counsel Fred
Fielding, and Deputy Attorney General Edward Schmults. Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1983, at Al, col.
7.
36. Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1983, at Al, col. 2.
37. Id Representative James H. Scheuer, chairman of an Energy and Commerce subcom-
mittee that was also investigating the EPA, explained the need for this circuitous method of disclo-
sure: "This charade was designed as a face saver for the president to get him off the sticky wicket
of insisting on executive privilege. We have to go through this little dog-and-pony show to get to
the unexpurgated, unedited documents .... Id
38. Id at A12, col. 2.
39. The subcommittee actually relied on two positions. First it claimed that the CERCLA
itself empowered Congress to request this information. See supra note 25. A member of the
subcommittee's staff also advised the EPA that "the Subcommittee's inquiry was being pursued
under the general authority of the Congress to conduct oversight and investigations, and the rules
of the House granting jurisdiction to the Committee and not simply under the authority granted
by Section 104(e)(2)(D) of the Superfund law." H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess 13 (1982).
(footnote omitted).
40. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
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empowered the President and his aides only to carry out the laws en-
acted by Congress and did not authorize those executive officials to
withhold documents necessary for Congress to oversee the operation of
the laws.41
1. The History of Congressional Oversight. The subcommittee
was relying upon its oversight authority when it subpoenaed the EPA
documents. Congress's right to inquire is essentially the right to con-
duct investigations relevant to its legislative functions.42 Congress may
conduct investigations into departments of the federal government as
well as, in some instances, the affairs of private citizens. 43 It may also
request information pursuant to these investigations.44
Several theories underlie the notion of congressional oversight.
The first is that the public is entitled to be informed of the workings of
its government. 45 Congress must therefore be able to determine how
federal laws are operating in order to be able to report to its constitu-
ents.46 Second, Congress must be able to investigate in order to deter-
mine whether remedial legislation is needed. 47 Third, Congress's
exercise of oversight protects the liberties of the American people by
serving as a check on unbridled executive power. Congress, by "ac-
quainting itself with the acts and dispositions of the administrative
agents of the Government,"48 will be able to uncover corruption, waste,
inefficiency, and rigidity49 and to ensure that the President is enforcing
the laws as enacted by Congress.
41. See H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1982).
42. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
The power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.
That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing
laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our
social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy
them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose
corruption, inefficiency or waste.
Id.
43. "There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals withoutjustfca-
lion in terms of the function of the Congress." Id at 187 (emphasis added).
44. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927). "Article Is grant of power to
legislate is therefore held to carry implied authority to summon witnesses and to compel the pro-
duction of evidence." Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (1974).
45. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957).
46. President Wilson considered this function to be extremely important: "The informing
function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function." W. WILSON, CONGRES-
SIONAL GOVERNMENT 297, 303 (1913), quotedin Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n.33
(1957).
47. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
48. Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 UCLA L. REv. 4, 10 (1974)(quoting W.
WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 297, 303 (1913)).
49. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has described Congress's oversight authority
as "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function." 50
The Court has, however, placed some limitations upon this power.51
First, pursuant to the separation of powers doctrine, Congress may not
reach into the "exclusive province" of the executive branch.5 2 Second,
exercise of the investigative power must be related to a legitimate legis-
lative task of Congress;53 there is no congressional power to expose
merely for the sake of exposure.5 4 These limitations, however, are not
unduly restrictive and leave Congress a great deal of freedom to deter-
mine whether the executive branch is properly enforcing the laws.55
2. The Subcommittee's Claims for the EPA Documents. The
subcommittee believed that it was properly invoking its oversight au-
thority in the Gorsuch dispute. It maintained that it had undertaken its
50. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927). Here, the Court was reviewing the
propriety of a Senate committee investigation into charges that the Department of Justice had
failed to prosecute public corruption, antitrust violations, and other matters relating to the han-
dling of several oil leases. The Court upheld the inquiry as a proper exercise of the legislative
function. Id at 180.
51. Some commentators have argued that Congress's oversight authority is, in fact, absolute.
See, e.g., R. BERGER, ExEctrUvE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUrIONAL MYrH (1974). Mr. Berger
looked "to the Constitution and its history" rather than to recent practice to determine the scope
of congressional control over information, id at 10, and found that the power to inquire is abso-
lute. Id at 36-37.
52. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959). The separation of powers doc-
trine imposes this limitation on the oversight power. This doctrine was created by the framers of
the Constitution, who considered the combination of powers of government to be "the very defini-
tion of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (J. Madison)(Wright ed. 1961). James Madison
expressed his fear that the "legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activ-
ity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex." THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 333 (J.
Madison)(J. Cooke ed. 1961). The separation of powers doctrine suggests that when the congres-
sional power of inquiry is directed at the executive branch, it cannot interfere with the executive
duties.
53. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 197 (1957). Watkins specifically mentions the
restraints of the Bill of Rights upon congressional investigations. Id at 198.
The Supreme Court used this restriction to invalidate a House investigation into a private
real estate pool that was part of the financial structure of J. Cook & Co. The United States had
deposited funds with the company, which went bankrupt. Congress believed that the pool was
connected with the bankruptcy. The Court found the inquiry to be judicial in nature because the
investigation "could result in no valid legislation on the subject to which the inquiry referred."
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192-97 (1881). The Court therefore held the inquiry to be in
excess of the investigative power conferred on the House by the Constitution. Id at 192.
54. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957).
55. Needless to say, congressional oversight produces beneficial results when used properly.
In 1927, a Senate committee investigation led to the discovery of the Teapot Dome scandal. See
Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry (Part 1), 12 UCLA L. REV. 1044, 1049 (1965);
149 CONG. Rac. HI0,052 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1982)(remarks of Rep. Dingell); see also McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177-78 (1927)(Court permitted congressional investigation into enforce-
ment decisions of the Department of Justice).
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investigation in order to determine whether the EPA was properly ad-
ministering the hazardous waste laws.56 Many members of Congress
and the public believed that the Reagan Administration and the EPA
were not carrying out Congress's mandate to aggressively decontami-
nate the nation's hazardous waste sites.57 Congress was concerned,
therefore, that the Reagan Administration was subverting the intent of
the Superfund laws by enforcing them half-heartedly.
In addition to reports of low morale at the EPA, Congress had
received specific charges of impropriety. EPA officials alleged that the
Administrator had allowed political considerations to enter into her en-
forcement decisions.58 The subcommittee also suspected the EPA of
giving hazardous waste polluters lenient settlement terms.59
The subcommittee believed that the requested documents would
56. The subcommittee also argued that the documents were necessary if Congress was to
make an informed decision whether to alter or repeal the CERCLA when it expires in 1985. 149
CONG. REC. H10,033 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1982).
57. As the New York Times explained the contempt citation against Administrator Gorsuch,
the "immediate cause was her refusal to hand over documents about EPA's clean-up enforcement
efforts. The underlying reason for the House's unprecedented action is its belief that her agency is
simply uninterested in doing anything about the country's myriad Love Canals, except to claim
success and let them fester." N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1982, at A22, col. 2.
The New York Times also stated that "the Reagan Administration, in its eagerness to ease
the burden of government regulation imposed on industry, had embarked on a systematic reversal
of decades of progress in the national effort to protect human health and natural resources from
environmental degradation." Shabecoff, Forecastfor E.P. Was Stormy From the Start, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 20, 1983, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 2, cols. 4-5.
58. Three EPA officials charged that clean-up of the Stringfellow site in California was held
up until after the November, 1982 California senatorial election for fear that then-Governor Ed-
mund G. Brown, Jr. might take credit for obtaining the federal funding and thereby benefit his
campaign for the Senate. Russakoff, White House Acts in EP4 Controversy, Wash. Post, Feb. 10,
1983, at A6, col. 6. Stating that "[plolitical considerations have not driven any decisions" in the
hazardous waste program, Ms. Gorsuch explained that it took time for the EPA to calculate Cali-
fornia's contribution to the cleanup, and to decide whether the agency should commence contrib-
uting to the cleanup, or bring suit against the polluters first. See id A Justice Department
investigation into the charges found a lack of evidence to implicate Ms. Gorsuch. See San Fran-
cisco Examiner, Aug. 11, 1983, at A6, col. I.
59. The subcommittee believed that two "sweetheart deals" may have been arranged be-
tween the EPA and businesses in violation of the CERCLA.
(1) In the fall of 1982, the EPA agreed to a private settlement for the cleanup of a facility of
the Seymour Recycling Corporation near Seymour, Indiana. The settlement, which was con-
cluded over the strong objections of EPA General Counsel Robert M. Perry, may enable 24 major
companies to avoid millions of dollars of liability. See Wash. Post, Feb. 10, 1983, at Al, col. 2.
(2) In August, 1982, the EPA announced a settlement agreement involving the Chem-Dyne
Corporation dumpsite in Hamilton, Ohio; 112 companies agreed to contribute a total of $12.3
million for surface cleanup. The EPA filed a lawsuit against 16 other firms that refused the settle-
ment terms. Critics noted that "the clean-up covered surface contamination only, and that the 112
companies, which settled for an average of just over $20,000 each, will face no further liability if
contamination later is found in groundwater or sub-surface soil." Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1983, at A4,
col. 3.
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help it determine whether the EPA was properly enforcing the law.6 0
These documents would reveal what factors the EPA was and, perhaps
more importantly, was not considering in making enforcement deci-
sions.61 This information would clarify the EPA's Superfund enforce-
ment strategy, a significant indicator of how closely the agency had
followed its congressional mandate. Furthermore, the subcommittee
believed that the documents would reveal whether any of the specific
charges of impropriety were true. Thus, Congress argued that the in-
vestigation was related to a legitimate legislative concern 62 and was a
proper exercise of its oversight authority. 63 If so, it follows that the
subcommittee had the power to compel disclosure of the requested doc-
uments, unless the exercise of that power was constrained by some
other legal doctrine.
B. The EPls Position.
Balanced against the subcommittee's exercise of the congressional
oversight power was the President's claim that Congress was interfering
with the executive responsibility to "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed." 64 Congress contended that this responsibility could
not protect an administrative agency against compelled disclosure.65
The EPA, however, contended that it was entitled, under the doctrine
of executive privilege, to withhold information if disclosure would in-
terfere with the executive's constitutional duties with regard to enforce-
ment of the laws.66
1. The History of Executive Privilege. The EPA's claim of exec-
utive privilege was neither novel nor surprising. Congress, in pursuing
its oversight duties, seeks much of its evidence from the executive
branch. Courts have interpreted Congress's power of inquiry to require
60. H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1982).
61. Id at 20. As the subcommittee explained: "[We] must be able to examine how and why
the agency is making its decision to enforce, or not to enforce, to litigate or not to litigate, to settle
or not settle with some, or all of the parties that may be involved in the various Superfund cases."
Id
The General Counsel to the Clerk of the House analogized to the congressional right upheld
by the Supreme Court in McGrain v. Daughterty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927), see supra note 50. He
maintained that the right to examine and inquire into specific enforcement decisions within the
Department of Justice "applies with equal, if not greater, force to the Environmental Protection
Agency." H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1982).
62. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
63. See 149 CONG. REc. HI0,052 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1982) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
64. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
65. See supra text accompanying note 41.
66. See 149 CONG. Rac. H10,055 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1982)(statement of Rep. Dannemeyer);
Petitioner'r Brief, supra note 6, at 55.
1342 [Vol. 1983:1333
Vol. 1983:1333] EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 1343
disclosure of executive documents.67 Nevertheless, cabinet officials
have invoked the doctrine of executive privilege to withstand both leg-
islative and judicial probing.68 The rationale behind the doctrine is
that in certain instances disclosure would either significantly impair the
performance of the constitutional responsibilities 69 of the executive
branch or interfere with its functioning as an independent branch of
the government. 70 When disclosure would cause such harm, the exec-
utive branch and its officials must be exempt from the disclosure
requirements.
Although a claim of executive privilege was raised as early as
1796,7t the Supreme Court did not recognize a constitutional founda-
tion for the privilege until 1974. In United States v. Nixon, 72 the Court
stated that "to the extent this interest [President Nixon's interest in
withholding incriminating tapes] relates to the effective discharge of the
President's powers, it is constitutionally based. ' 73 The Nixon Court
recognized that executive privilege was a byproduct of the separation
67. Cox, supra note 44, at 1385-86.
68. For a general discussion of the scope of executive privilege, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J.N. YOUNG, CONSTITTIONAL LAW 224-30 (2d ed. 1983).
69. Underlying this consideration is a concern that without the privilege, officials would be
unwilling to engage in frank, open discussion for fear of later reprisals. As the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia noted, "the privilege subserves a preponderating policy
of frank expression and discussion among those upon whom rests the responsibility for making
the determination that enables government to operate." Carl v. Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl
Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C. 1966)(footnotes omitted).
70. The Supreme Court recognized this argument as support for the privilege. See infra note
74 and accompanying text. President Washington voiced this argument in his Farewell Address:
It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire
caution in those entrusted with its administration to confine themselves within their re-
spective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department
to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of
all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real
despotism.
Speech of President George Washington, Sept. 17, 1796, quoted in Younger, Congressional Investi-
gations and Executive Secrecy: A Study in the Separation of Powers, 22 U. PrrT. L. REv. 755, 758
(1959).
71. President Washington had invoked this doctrine just five months prior to his farewell
speech when he refused to turn over papers requested by a House committee formed to examine
the failure of a military campaign against the Indians. He maintained that the House had no right
to those documents, as they related to matters exclusively within the executive's domain.
Younger, supra note 70, at 758.
72. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). The case arose out of the now infamous Watergate investigation.
The Special Prosecutor had issued a subpoena directing the President to produce tape recordings
and documents relating to his conversations with aides and advisors. The documents were re-
quested following the indictment of a number of White House staff members and supporters for
violations of federal statutes. President Nixon claimed executive privilege and filed a motion to
quash the subpoena. Although the Supreme Court denied the motion, it recognized an executive
privilege. The Court held, however, that the privilege was not absolute. Id at 706.
73. Id at 711.
DUKE LAW JOUM[3AL
of powers doctrine;74 if Congress were allowed to inquire into every
area of the executive's province it could exert improper influence upon
the President's power. The Court also suggested that the privilege
could be readily inferred from article II,75 the constitutional provision
that outlines the executive's duties. Confidentiality is necessary for the
President to properly carry out his responsibilities, because it fosters the
free flow of information and candor necessary for effective
decisionmaking.76
The Nixon opinion recognized that the privilege was not absolute.
The Court held that "[t]he generalized assertion of privilege must yield
to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal
trial." 77 The opinion was, however, somewhat vague as to when execu-
tive privilege would give way to legislative probing. The highest defer-
ence is to be given to claims of executive privilege for military and
diplomatic secrets. The Court stated that
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive
national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument
that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential
communications is significantly diminished by production of such
material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a dis-
trict court will be obliged to provide.78
The Nixon Court did not state that executive privilege was never appli-
cable to protect information other than that which implicates national
security. Presidential communications are "presumptively privi-
leged";79 there is, however, no high degree of deference due a presiden-
tial assertion of privilege when there is only a generalized executive
interest in confidentiality.80 Instead the Court seemed to imply that the
President, in order to prevail on his privilege claim, had to demonstrate
convincingly that confidentiality would be compromised.81
74. Id at 706.
75. See id at 707.
76. Id 708.
77. Id at 713.
78. Id at 706; see Henkin, Executive Privilege: Mr. Nixon Loses But The Presidency Largely
Prevails, 22 UCLA L. REv. 40, 44 (1974).
79. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708.
80. Id at 711.
81. See id The Nixon Court's opinion has been criticized, in part, for its failure to establish
clear guidelines for future disputes. See Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on
United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV. 76, 91 (1974).
Two Watergate era cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit help to illuminate the factors considered by courts in executive privilege cases.
In Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court determined that the presumption of
privilege premised on the public interest in confidentiality failed in the face of a powerful showing
made by the Special Prosecutor of a vital need for the President to produce certain tape recordings
pursuant to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. The court applied a balancing test, stating that
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The Nixon opinion was concerned with the use of the privilege "as
against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes,"8 2 and
the way the privilege interfered with the judiciary's ability to "do jus-
tice in criminal prosecutions. '8 3 The Court explicitly rejected the no-
tion that it was addressing the balance between the President's
generalized interest in confidentiality and congressional demands for
information.8 4 "The opinion nonetheless lends some support to the
the "application of Executive privilege depends on a weighing of the public interest protected by
the privilege against the public interest that would be served by disclosure in a particular case."
Id. at 716; see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)(in determining
whether the proper balance between the coordinate branches has been upset, the proper inquiry
focuses on the extent to which the executive branch is prevented from accomplishing its constitu-
tionally assigned functions); Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339, 346
(D.C. Cir. 1977)(executive privilege upheld as the government requirement of secrecy was "the
more compelling need"). The Nixon v. Sirica court emphasized that the grand jury
is not engaged in a general fishing expedition, nor does it seek in any way to investigate
the wisdom of the President's discharge of his discretionary duties. On the contrary, the
grand jury seeks evidence that may well be conclusive to its decisions in on-going investi-
gations that are entirely within the proper scope of its authority.
487 F.2d at 717.
Although a grand jury proceeding assures the confidentiality of executive officials' testimony
and of agency documents, closed congressional committee meetings can probably approximate the
secrecy of the grand jury. The second Watergate era case, Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 498
F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974), dealt with an executive refusal to hand over documents subpoenaed by
a congressional committee. The court determined that the need demonstrated by the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities for some of President Nixon's tapes was "too
attenuated and too tangential to its functions to permit a judicial judgment that the President is
required to comply with the Committee's subpoena." Id. at 733. The court noted that the com-
mittee could point "to no specific legislative decisions that cannot responsibly be made without
access to materials uniquely contained in the tapes or without resolution of the ambiguities that
the transcripts may contain." Id The subpoenaed materials were in the possession of the House
Judiciary Committee and there was no showing that the Select Committee needed access of its
own. Id The Senate Select Committee opinion noted "the presumption that the public interest
favors confidentiality," which "can be defeated only by a strong showing of need by another
institution of government-a showing that the responsibilities of that institution cannot respon-
sibly be fulfilled without access to records of the President's deliberations." Id at 730.
It has been suggested that executive branch officials should have to make a stronger showing
to invoke executive privilege when there are accusations of executive wrongdoing. See Ratner,
Executive Privilege, Self-Incrimination, and the Separation of Powers Illustration, 22 UCLA L.
Rav. 92, 104 (1974). Nevertheless, the propriety of a congressional demand for material must
finally turn on the "nature and appropriateness of the function in performance of which the mate-
rial was sought, and the degree to which the material was necessary to its fulfillment." Senate
Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 731. Certainly the inquiry into possible executive wrongdoing is an
appropriate function of Congress, and the executive branch will lose its claim of privilege if a
House committee can show that "subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible
fulfillment of the Committee's functions." Id The court suggests that it will be more difficult for
a congressional committee to demonstrate the requisite need to overcome executive privilege than
it would be for a grand jury to do so. Id at 732.
82. 418 U.S. at 707.
83. Id
84. The Nixon Court stated:
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proposition that the President may, in certain circumstances, withhold
information from the Congress."8 5
Professor Laurence Tribe has classified presidential refusals to fur-
nish information as three distinct executive privileges, derived from
three distinct considerations. 86 First, presidents have invoked executive
privilege in order to protect military or diplomatic secrets.87 Second,
the law of evidence includes an informer's privilege-"the Govern-
ment's privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with
enforcement of that law."' 88 Third, courts recognize a privilege ex-
tending to "intra-govemmental documents reflecting advisory opin-
ions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated." 89
In the Gorsuch dispute the latter two types of executive privilege
were at issue. The EPA documents concerned law enforcement ifies
that might contain information of EPA's secret informants. The files
also contained intra-agency memos and recommendations that EPA
personnel compiled for use in making Superfund enforcement policy
and decisions.
In the Gorsuch dispute, an agency director invoked the privilege,
but she did so at the express request of the chief executive. Executive
privilege extends to agency officials, but it may not apply with force
equal to that afforded the President's personal assertion of the privi-
lege. In United States v. Reynolds,90 the Court stated that the privilege
belongs to the government, and must be asserted in a formal claim
We are not here concerned with the balance between the President's generalized interest
in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with that
between the confidentiality interest and congressional demands for information, nor with
the President's interest in preserving state secrets. We address only the conflict between
the President's assertion of a generalized privilege of confidentiality and the constitu-
tional need for relevant evidence in criminal trials.
Id. at 711 n.19.
85. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-15 n.l (1978); see also Henkin, supra
note 78, at 43.
86. L. TIUBE, supra note 85, § 4-14.
87. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (1971)(Stewart, J.
concurring)(Pentagon Papers Case).
88. See, e.g., Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
89. See, e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C.
1966)(various applications of executive privilege listed by the court, 40 F.R.D. at 324 n. 15).
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 149 (1975), noted that the
ultimate purpose of this long-recognized privilege is to prevent injury to the quality of agency
decisions. The quality of a particular agency decision will clearly be affected by the communica-
tions received by the decision-maker on the subject of the decision between predecisional commu-
nications, which are privileged, and communications designed to explain a decision already made,
which are not. Id at 151.
90. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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lodged by the head of the department that has control over the matter9'
"after personal consideration by that officer." 92
Two recent cases interpreting the extent of executive immunity
from civil liability may offer some insight into whether executive privi-
lege becomes less compelling when asserted by a cabinet member in-
stead of the President. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald,93 the Supreme Court
held that "a former President of the United States is entitled to absolute
immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We
consider this immunity a functionally mandated incident of the Presi-
dent's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separa-
tion of powers and supported by our history. ' 94 This absolute
immunity exists at least where Congress has not expressly subjected the
President to civil liability for his official acts.95 Yet, in the companion
case, Harlow v. Fitzgerald,96 the Court found only a qualified immunity
for senior presidential aides and advisers. When these officials claim
absolute immunity they "first must show that the responsibilities of
[their] office embraced a function so sensitive as to require a total shield
from liability."97 The strength of a derivative claim to presidential im-
munity thus depends upon the executive function invoked; the claim
would be strongest when made by presidential "alter egos" working in
91. Id at 7-8.
92. The Reynolds court explained that the "essential matter is that the decision to object
should be taken by the minister who is the political head of the department, and that he should
have seen and considered the contents of the documents and himself have formed the view that on
grounds of public interest they ought not to be produced." Id at 8 n.20 (citing Duncan v. Cam-
mell, Laird & Co., 1942 A.C. 624, 638 (H.L.)).
93. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
94. Id. at 749.
95. The Court noted that granting the President absolute immunity did not remove all con-
straints upon his power to act:
There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment. In addition, there are formal
and informal checks on Presidential action that do not apply with equal force to other
executive officials. The President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. Vigilant
oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well as to
make credible the threat of impeachment. Other incentives to avoid misconduct may
include a desire to earn re-election, the need to maintain prestige as an element of Presi-
dential influence, and a President's traditional concern for his historical stature.
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immu-
nity will not place the President "above the law." For the President, as for judges and
prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged
misconduct in order to advance compelling public ends.
Id at 757-58 (footnotes omitted).
96. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
97. Id at 812-13. The Harlow Court also concluded that "government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their con-
duct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known." Id at 818. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506
(1978)("federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional
conduct must bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope").
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such exclusively executive domains as foreign policy and national se-
curity.98 The EPA cleanup function does not qualify as such a sensi-
tive, exclusively executive responsibility. Thus, although
Administrator Gorsuch had a claim of executive privilege available to
her, the privilege did not provide an absolute shield.
2. The Executive Branch's Arguments Against Disclosing The Doc-
uments. The EPA contended that disclosure of the documents would
have a deleterious effect on pending investigations 99 and interfere with
its ability to administer the Superfund. 1°° These were, in fact, valid
concerns. 101 Many of the documents concerned cases in the early
stages of investigation, where disclosure could be particularly harmful.
Revealing the information'02 could forewarn depositors of hazardous
wastes that they were suspected of illegal activity. Disclosure would
also place the EPA at a disadvantage in settlement negotiations with
these violators. The requested files included: the EPA's proposed set-
tlement strategies, lists of potential witnesses, detailed descriptions of
available evidence, anticipated defenses, the elements of proof required
in a given case, the legal issues involved, and the possible precedential
impact of certain rulings. If this information became public, the targets
of the investigations would know the EPA's bottom-line settlement po-
98. 457 U.S. at 812 nn.18-19.
99. As Attorney General Smith explained in a letter to Representative John Dingell, "[t]he
Executive cannot effectively investigate if Congress is, in a sense, a partner in the investigation. If
a congressional committee is fully appraised of all details of an investigation as the investigation
proceeds, there is a substantial danger that congressional pressures will influence the course of the
investigation." Letter to Hon. John H. Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Inves-
tigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.,
(Nov. 30, 1982), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (1982).
100. See 149 CONG. REc. H10,055 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1982) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer);
Petitioner'r Brief, supra note 6, at 55.
101. The Reagan Administration's additional fears about the precedential effect of full acqui-
escence to the congressional subpoena, on the other hand, were highly speculative. The Adminis-
tration worried that President Reagan's willingness to accommodate Congress in this instance
might make it harder for future presidents to resist demands for enforcement documents relating
to areas outside the environmental protection field. See 149 CONG. REc. H10,057-58 (daily ed.
Dec. 16, 1982)(statement of Rep. Clausen).
102. The Reagan Administration had good reason for concern that information in the with-
held documents might reach unintended parties. As Joseph Bishop, deputy general counsel of the
Army from July, 1952 to October, 1953, noted, "there can be no guarantee that information com-
ing into the hands of Congress or the whole membership of one of its major committees will long
remain secret .... Even legislators of high respectability have been known, in the heat of parti-
san passion, to place the national interest a very poor second to considerations of faction." Bishop
used, as an example, an incident taking place in 1941 when Senator Burton K. Wheeler, an isola-
tionist, had revealed the Navy's occupation of Iceland while the operation was still in progress and
the ships involved were vulnerable to attack. Bishop, The Executive's Right to Privacy.- An Un-
resolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477, 487 & n.41 (1957).
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sition, its negotiation strategy, and the agency's perception of the
strengths and weaknesses of its case. 103 This information might enable
a violator to negotiate a more favorable settlement. Finally, public dis-
closure of the documents would make it easier for violators to defend
themselves against lawsuits.
Thus, both the subcommittee and the EPA had valid claims to the
documents. Neither the legislative nor the executive branch has guide-
lines for resolving such competing claims. As one Congressman noted
during the debate preceding the contempt vote, "the Supreme Court
has yet to be called upon to resolve the question of the respective rights
of the executive and legislative branches in regard to a claim of privi-
lege as a defense to compulsory legislative process for documents resid-
ing within the Executive Branch."' °4 Because both parties believed
that they had an absolute claim to the documents, a settlement was
slow to emerge.
III. ANALYSIS FOR FUTURE DISPUTES
The Gorsuch dispute was by no means sui generis. It is likely that
this problem will recur. In order to avoid confrontations more severe
than that involving Ms. Gorsuch, this note suggests guidelines for
weighing the competing claims of the legislative and executive
branches.
A. Compromise Between the Branches.
Despite the political question doctrine, the judiciary is often avail-
able as the final arbiter in interbranch disputes. Judicial solutions
should, however, be a last resort; 0 5 parties should be encouraged to
resolve their differences outside of court, as in the Gorsuch dispute.
103. Petiionerr Brief, supra note 6, at 67.
104. 149 CONG. REc. H10,042 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1982)(statement of Rep. Solomon).
105. In fact, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia demonstrated this
restraint in the Gorsuch controversy. The Government had asked the court to declare that Ms.
Gorsuch had acted lawfully in refusing to release the requested documents. The court refused. It
stated:
Courts have a duty to avoid unnecessarily deciding constitutional issues... . When
constitutional disputes arise concerning the respective powers of the Legislative and Ex-
ecutive Branches, judicial intervention should be delayed until all possibilities for settle-
ment have been exhausted .... Judicial restraint is essential to maintain the delicate
balance of powers among the branches established by Constitution .... Since the con-
troversy which has led to United States v. House of Representatives clearly raises difficult
constitutional questions in the context of an intragovernmental dispute, the Court should
not address these issues until circumstances indicate that judicial intervention is neces-
sary.
United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152-53 (D.D.C. 1983)(citation
omitted).
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Most disputes are susceptible to compromise, 0 6 and this is the pre-
ferred method of resolution.
Informal compromise has several advantages relative to judicial
resolution. First, courts are not well equipped to evaluate the conflict-
ing claims of the executive and legislative branches. They have no ex-
pertise in weighing the Congress's legislative needs against the
President's political imperatives. 0 7 A court ruling in aparticular dis-
pute might hamstring either the President or Congress during future
disputes in perhaps markedly different political environments. For ex-
ample, such a ruling might unduly limit Congress's ability to investi-
gate. As one scholar has noted:
The need for access to executive papers and communications arises
too seldom in traditional forms of civil or criminal proceeding for the
judicial rulings to have much impact upon the effectiveness of the
Presidency, but the occasions upon which Congress may demand in-
formation are virtually unlimited. Any binding definition of the
power of the Senate or House of Representatives to obtain the inter-
nal communications of the Executive Branch and of the President to
withhold them might greatly affect the relative political power and
effectiveness of the Executive and Legislative Branches.' 08
Compromise, as a method of resolution, has worked well in the
past. The courts have been hesitant to resolve struggles between the
President and Congress, yet Congress has managed to compel the Pres-
ident to hand over information on many occasions.'0 9 Congress has
powerful political weapons capable of compelling disclosure.' 1o It con-
trols appropriations and legislation" ' and, perhaps most significantly,
commands media attention" 2 and with it the ability to mobilize public
opinion against the executive. Congress may also obtain information
through the now-established device of a special prosecutor, and
106. Cf Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1978)("The courts must presume
that the committees of Congress will exercise their powers responsibly and with due regard for the
rights of affected parties.").
107. Paul J. Mishkin, speaking of United States v. Nixon, contended that the "fundamental
evil is that the Court was confronted with the issue. The basic failing was that the problem was
not resolved by the political system, including the other two branches of government, before it
reached the Court." Mishkin, supra note 81, at 91.
108. Cox, supra note 44, at 1425-26.
109. See id at 1431.
110. See id at 1431-32; Berger, supra note 3, at 1320.
111. Bishop, supra note 102, at 486.
112. For an example of newspaper reaction to the contempt citation against Gorsuch, see An
Unnecessary Face-Off, L. A. Times, Dec. 19, 1982, at V-4, col. 1 ("considering Gorsuch's record as
the administrator of EPA, it is fair to say that her resistance to disclosure of the documents may
have more to do with lack of enforcement than with a theoretical danger of harming the agency's
enforcement efforts"). See also The Supefund Turned Upside Down, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1982, at
A22, col. 1.
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through its more drastic powers to issue contempt citations' 3 and insti-
tute impeachment proceedings. Congress's willingness to use such
weapons ensures that the executive will not lightly reject a congres-
sional request for information.
Finally, the imprecision of the demarcation line between conflict-
ing claims of executive secrecy and congressional inquiry encourages
both parties to seek a compromise. "Neither the executive nor the
Congress is very sure of its rights and both usually evince a tactful dis-
position not to push the assertion of their rights to abusive extremes.
Of such is the system of checks and balances."' 1 4
The Gorsuch dispute itself is a good example of how effective
these forces can be in inducing a compromise. Congress appeared ea-
ger to rush into an unseemly confrontation with the executive branch
without having fully explored the opportunities for reaching a compro-
mise." 5 The House subcommittee issued a perhaps unnecessarily
broad"t6 subpoena and did not review the material that Ms. Gorsuch
was prepared to turn over prior to undertaking a contempt proceeding
against her. Yet despite its apparent intransigence, the subcommittee
113. Professor Bishop notes that:
Congress undoubtedly has power to punish contempts without invoking the aid of the
executive and the judiciary, by the simple forthright process of causing the Sergeant at
Arms to seize the offender and clap him in the common jail of the District of Columbia
or the guard room of the Capital Police.
Bishop, supra note 102, at 484. In fact, such action was threatened by congressional counsel Stan-
ley M. Brand. See Chi. Trib., Feb. 2, 1983, at 14, col. 1.
114. Bishop, supra note 102, at 491.
115. The members of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation who did not sup-
port the recommendation that Administrator Gorsuch be cited for contempt of Congress noted
that "[t]he Committee did not exhaust all means of resolving the dispute before resorting to the
contempt citation." H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1982)(minority views). The
dissenting members cited several examples:
First, prior to the Full Committee meeting, White House officials asked to meet with
the Full Committee Chairman and Ranking Minority Member. The meeting was not
held.
Second, White House officials offered to show the Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member a sampling of the withheld documents so that they would better understand the
Administration's position on this matter. This overture was rejected.
Third, a compromise proposal was offered which would have given the U.S. District
Court in the District of Columbia the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the Sub-
committee's subpoena. White House officials indicated that the Administration would
not only support this legislation but would work in the House and Senate to enact it
during the lameduck session. This proposal was rejected.
And fourth, the Administration, in responding to a compromise proposal made by
the Subcommittee Chairman, offered a counter proposal in a letter dated December 9,
1982. No formal response was made to the Administration's proposal prior to the Full
Committee meeting to cite Ms. Gorsuch for contempt.
Id at 74.
116. Representative Michel stated that the subpoena, which covered more than 750,000 pages
of EPA documents, "looked like it was based on a fishing expedition." 149 CONG. REc. H10,047
(daily ed. Dec. 16, 1982).
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eventually compromised. Both sides were placated and the national
hazardous waste disposal effort benefitted.
B. Judicial Resolution of the Dispute.
Although interbranch conflicts are best resolved by compromise,
courts must be prepared to act when the two branches are unwilling to
settle their differences. When a stalemate occurs, 17 the judiciary may
have to intervene to avoid "detrimental effects on the smooth function-
ing of government."' 18
1. The Political Question Doctrine. The potential necessity for
intervention raises the problem of whether a court can resolve such a
dispute. The Gorsuch controversy appears, at first glance, to be of the
type defined by the Supreme Court as a "political question" and to be
therefore nonjusticiable. "The political question doctrine-which
holds that certain matters are really political in nature and best re-
solved by the body politic rather than suitable for judicial review-is a
misnomer."' " 9 The political question doctrine is more aptly character-
ized as a doctrine of nonjusticiability that applies when the subject
matter in dispute is inappropriate for judicial consideration. 120 Never-
theless, the Supreme Court often renders decisions in cases involving
"political" issues. The Court has fashioned the following test for deter-
mining whether the doctrine should be invoked:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve ... [a] polit-
ical question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question. 121
In United States v. Nixon, Chief Justice Burger rejected the argument
that President Nixon's claim of executive privilege presented a political
question, because the controversy in that case was one that the courts
traditionally resolve under their article III power: the production or
117. See, e.g., Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854, 858 (D. Mass. 1973).
118. United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
119. J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG, supra note 68, at 109.
120. Id
121. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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nonproduction of specified evidence that the prosecutor deemed rele-
vant to and admissible in a pending criminal case.122
It is not certain that the Gorsuch controversy would have qualified
as a nonjusticiable question. 23 Raoul Berger has argued:
Neither the Congress nor the nation can be content to have the exec-
utive branch finally draw constitutional boundaries when the conse-
quence is seriously to impair a legislative function that is so vital to
the democratic process. No more may Congress decide the scope of
Executive power. Neither Branch, in Madison's words, has the "su-
perior right of settling the boundaries between their respective pow-
ers." That power was given to the courts."' 124
A court would likely consider the Gorsuch case to be closely analogous
to United States v. Nixon. In both cases the President sought to deny
information from an investigating body, be it court or congressional
committee, on the basis of executive privilege. Congress's subpoenas
and the rules governing their enforcement do not substantially differ
from their judicial counterparts. Admittedly, Congress has its own in-
dependent mechanisms for enforcing its processes. Yet the Nixon
Court's decision not to invoke the political question doctrine did not
depend on the specific processes available to courts for enforcement of
their subpoenas. 25 Instead the court was concerned with the presence
of judicially manageable standards, standards that would not be dra-
matically affected if the requesting body were a congressional commit-
tee rather than a court. 26
122. 418 U.S. at 696-97. In a case presenting a classic nonjusticiable political question, the
court declined to hear a petitioner seeking an end to the Vietnam War. See Drinan v. Nixon, 364
F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1973). Such a case is readily distinguishable from the Gorsuch
controversy.
123. The District Court seemed to have confronted this issue. In refusing to issue a declara-
tory judgment, the court noted, "the Judicial Branch will be required to resolve the dispute by
determining the validity of the Administrator's claim of executive privilege" should the parties be
unable to compromise. United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.D.C.
1983).
124. Berger, supra note 3, at 1361-62; see Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 715 (D.C.Cir. 1973).
125. Cf. United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D.D.C. 1983)("Ju-
dicial resolution of this constitutional claim. . . will never become necessary unless Administra-
tor Gorsuch becomes a defendant in either a criminal contempt proceeding or other legal action
taken by Congress.").
126. Some commentators remain concerned that future disputes between Congress and the
executive branch might raise nonjusticiable questions unless some further action is taken. One
commentator suggests:
What is needed is a new statute that would provide the federal courts with undisputed
jurisdiction to hear a suit brought by Congress to enforce its subpoenas to executive
branch officials; [sic] require that executive officials promptly answer Congress' com-
plaint, and require that the courts, including the Supreme Court, give the case expedi-
tious treatment.
Hamilton, Settling Inter-Branch Disputes, New Haven Register, Feb. 8, 1983, at 7, col. 1; see also
Berger, Executive Privilege v. CongressionalInquiry, 12 UCLA L. REv. 1288, 1361-62 (1965); Cox,
supra note 44, at 1432-35 (1974).
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2. A Frameworkfor Analyzing Future Disputes. Once a court
has satisfied itself that it is not faced with a nonjusticiable issue, it can
proceed to the merits of the claim. In analyzing a collision between
Congress and the executive branch, a court must first assure itself that
both the oversight power and executive privilege are being properly
asserted. Congress must be undertaking a legitimate legislative func-
tion and the executive branch must be correct that the information is of
a type traditionally considered to be privileged. Once the court has
made this determination it must determine which claim should prevail.
Although the Supreme Court has neither resolved a dispute similar to
the Gorsuch controversy nor provided a framework for doing so, the
lower courts have developed a test that would be applicable here. In
Nixon v. Sirica, 27 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit stated that a judge, in reviewing a claim for execu-
tive privilege, must balance the public interest protected by the privi-
lege against the interests that would be served by disclosure of
particular information. 2 8 One year later that same court suggested, in
Senate Select Committee v. Nixon,129 that in weighing these interests a
court should begin with a presumption in favor of confidentiality.130
Congress would then have to rebut the presumption by demonstrating
a compelling and specific need for the disputed materials. 131 If Con-
gress satisfied its burden, the court would order disclosure.
In evaluating competing claims, the court must first decide how
much weight to accord the presumption in favor of executive privilege.
To do so, it must evaluate the type of information being requested.
Military and diplomatic secrets have been considered absolutely privi-
leged, 32 so that, no matter how compelling the case for disclosure,
Congress will probably never be able to satisfy its burden. 33 Interof-
fice memoranda, although presumptively privileged, are not given the
absolute protection afforded military secrets. Although the Supreme
Court in United States v. Nixon 134 noted the importance of maintaining
confidentiality, 35 the Court also stated that "we cannot conclude that
127. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
128. Id at 716.
129. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
130. Id at 730.
131. Id
132. See supra text accompanying note 78.
133. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1952)("Where there is a strong showing of
necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling
necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military
secrets are at stake.")
134. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
135. Id at 705; see also supra text accompanying note 76.
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advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the
infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that such
conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal prosecu-
tion."136 Admittedly, a civil investigation may implicate different con-
cerns than a criminal proceeding and a court should take these
differences into account; a court, however, should do so in light of the
assumption that such documents are not granted the highest degree of
protection possible.
In determining the weight to accord to a claim of executive privi-
lege, a court should also take into account any relevant statutes. These
may indicate congressional recognition, not only that a claim of execu-
tive privilege exists in certain areas, but that there is a public interest
that would be served by protecting confidentiality. The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit utilized this method of analy-
sis in Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America. 137 It reviewed a request for
law enforcement documents. In evaluating a claim of executive privi-
lege, the court assessed whether there was a public interest in minimiz-
ing disclosure. 138 It noted that the Freedom of Information Act, which
compels the disclosure of a number of government documents, pro-
vides an exemption for documents similar to those requested by the
House subcommittee.' 39 The court stated that this exemption embod-
ied a congressional recognition of the necessity for the privilege,140 and
it took this conclusion into account in determining whether the plain-
tiff, in this case a private party, had satisfied its burden of demonstra-
ting an interest outweighing the confidentiality interest.
141
Finally, a court evaluating a claim of privilege should also con-
sider the identity of the party asserting that claim. As noted previ-
ously, 142 the strength of the privilege may be diminished when a
cabinet official asserts its protection, as compared to an assertion by the
President himself.
136. 418 U.S. at 712.
137. 564 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Sheraton, the plaintiff was a private lobbyist affiliated
with Robert Baker, Secretary to the Majority of the Senate. Black was indicted, and ultimately
convicted, on income tax evasion charges. He claimed that both the indictment and his subse-
quent difficulty obtaining new employment were caused by government dissemination of informa-
tion collected by an illegal eavesdrop. He sought discovery, under the Freedom of Information
Act, of certain documents associated with the prosecution. The government refused to disclose
several of the documents, except to a district court in camera.
138. Id at 545-46.
139. Id at 546; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982) (exemption for "investigatory records compiled
for law enforcement purposes").
140. 564 F.2d at 546.
141. Id at 547.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 91-98.
1355Vol. 1983:1333]
DUKE L4W JO UVAL
The court must consider these factors in light of the interests as-
serted by Congress. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Nixon, t43 a "demonstrated, specific need" for material may be found
to be more compelling than a general assertion of executive privi-
lege.144 The degree of specificity is not the only factor relevant to a
court's inquiry. The court should also examine the underlying interest
that Congress seeks to protect. For instance, when Congress voices a
convincing concern that the health of inhabitants of certain communi-
ties is in imminent danger, its request for documents should be ac-
corded greater deference than a request for materials regarding the use
of tax money to build public highways. In other words, the magnitude
of the danger and its probability are both relevant concerns.
In striking the balance between Congress and the President, a
court must be concerned with how much the disclosure would impair
or disrupt the President's ability to carry out his consitutibnal duties. If
necessary, the court should establish a system of procedural safeguards
to ensure that Congress's access to the documents will be accomplished
with minimal infringement on the President's article II powers. For
instance, a court could conduct an in camera inspection of the docu-
ments.145 Such private examination would allow a judge to release
only those documents necessary to the legislative duty to inquire into
the operation of the laws, while minimizing the release of documents
genuinely harmful to the presidency. Such a procedure, however,
might impose huge burdens on particular federal judges, who would be
required to sort putatively privileged material to determine which doc-
uments are relevant to Congress's inquiry. As a less burdensome rem-
edy, a court could require that Congress receive the sensitive materials
only in executive session, a measure that would promote
confidentiality. 146
143. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
144. Id. at 713.
145. See id. at 730; cf. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 330-33
(D.D.C. 1966). "The ultimate question is whether, in the circumstances of the case, the occasion
for assertion of the privilege is appropriate. In camera inspection is not an end in itself, but only a
method that may in given instances be indispensable to decision of that question." Id at 332. See
generally United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952).
146. Under the analysis suggested in this note, judicial resolution of the Gorsuch matter would
have led to the release of the Superfund enforcement documents. The President's assertion of
executive privilege would have created a presumption in favor of applying the privilege. The
presumption would not have been insurmountable, however. First, the documents were not mili-
tary secrets and were therefore not accorded absolute protection. Second, the privilege was being
asserted by a cabinet official, not by the President. Congress's showing of a specific legislative
need to inquire into the operation of CERCLA and into allegations of governmental wrongdoing
would then have defeated the presumption in favor of the privilege and would have justified a
court order requiring the EPA to turn over the disputed documents to the subcommittee. But, in
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In utilizing this note's suggested framework for resolving this type
of dispute, the courts will be able to maintain the necessary balance
between the need for full congressional inquiry into the operation of
the laws and the legitimate requirements of secrecy in the executive
branch. The courts must protect the integrity of the administrative pro-
cess from mere unfocused curiosity. 14 7 For example, few would con-
done congressional demands made to the Justice Department for
transcripts of testimony to a grand jury obtained as part of an ongoing
investigation into organized crime. Thus, executive confidentiality in
some circumstances must be protected. Yet Congress must be able to
guard against governmental deception1 48 and to exercise its oversight
authority. Its rights should not be limited merely because the President
asserts that certain information should not be disclosed. 149 The sug-
gested shifting burden test takes the President's concerns into account.
If a court assumes that executive officials have the privilege to withhold
information whenever Congress is unable to demonstrate otherwise,
the court protects administrators and relieves them from the anomaly
of having to make public the reasons for keeping certain information
private. Yet such a test does not unduly circumscribe congressional
power. In instances where the information is necessary, and requested
pursuant to a legitimate legislative need, such as when Congress is
view of the demonstrated executive need to keep enforcement documents secret, the reviewing
court would have been obliged to provide for special procedures that would minimize the in-
fringement on executive duties and powers by preventing improper disclosure of the documents.
147. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941). In Morgan, the Supreme Court held
that a court could not depose the Secretary of Agriculture regarding the process by which he
determined the maximum rates to be charged by market agencies for their services at the Kansas
City stockyards, because "the integrity of the administrative process must be. . . respected." Id
at 422; see also Cox, supra note 44, at 1429. Raoul Berger makes a distinction between a privilege
for "secrets of the cabinet" and
an unlimited discretion to withhold any document or communications between the sev-
eral million subordinate employees in the interest of "administrative efficiency."...
The two are incommensurable. An assumption that information may be concealed from
Congress on the plea of "administrative efficiency" would have shielded Fall, Denby and
Daugherty from congressional investigation and have enabled them to despoil the nation
of Teapot Dome, and all in the guise of taking "care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted!"
Berger, supra note 3, at 1289-90.
148. As Cox explained, the "claim of privilege is a useful way of hiding inefficiency, malad-
ministration, breach of trust or corruption, and also a variety of potentially controversial executive
practices not authorized by Congress." Cox, supra note 44, at 1433. He also noted that the "cen-
tral problem today is how to deal with governmental secrecy and ... with governmental decep-
tion." Id at 1434.
149. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated in Nixon v. Sirica,
"although the views of the Chief Executive on whether his Executive privilege should obtain are
properly given the greatest weight and deference, they cannot be conclusive." 487 F.2d 700, 716
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
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properly using its oversight authority, the court will compel disclosure.
In short, the integrity of both branches can be preserved.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress's citation for contempt of EPA Administrator Anne Gor-
such illustrates a recurring problem in American constitutional history:
the clash between the congressional right to inquire into the operation
of the laws and the executive right to secrecy in intradepartmental com-
munications-specifically the secrecy of law enforcement records and
intra-agency recommendations. Congress's oversight power has long
been recognized as an incident of the constitutional grant of legislative
power. Executive privilege is based on the need for confidentiality of
executive communications and is implied by the separation of powers
doctrine. Neither congressional oversight nor executive secrecy is abso-
lute, and it is inevitable that the two doctrines will conflict with one
another from time to time.
The two branches should first attempt to resolve any conflict on
their own. When compromise is not forthcoming, and a court is not
precluded by the political question doctrine from adjudicating the dis-
pute, judicial resolution of a dispute may be necessary in order to end
governmental stalemate. In such a case, the court should employ a bal-
ancing test that presumes that the executive branch should not or-
dinarily be compelled to disclose information regarding sensitive
matters such as national security affairs and pending law enforcement
decisions. Congress may defeat the presumption only if it can demon-
strate a specific legislative need. Such an arrangement will assure the
integrity of both branches and prevent stalemate in our federal system.
Ronald L. Claveloux
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